Korean Workers and Neoliberal Globalization by Kevin Gray

Author:Kevin Gray [Gray, Kevin]
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Tags: Ethnic Studies, Labor & Industrial Relations, Social Science, Political Science, Regional Studies, General
ISBN: 9781134112319
Google: v2puILuz4KcC
Goodreads: 17575775
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2007-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

The ‘Economic and Financial’ and Social Agreement Politics

Whilst the trend of neoliberalization of the Korean economy had been marked throughout the Kim Young-Sam government, it was the economic and financial crisis in late 1997 and the political responses to it that posed the greatest challenge to the labour movement. As soon at the bailout agreement was signed on 5 December 1997, it became clear that crisis management would involve both direct and indirect attacks on the working class through labour market flexiblization, which would in turn require the reform of the labour laws. This was viewed by the IMF, the Korean government and business as being a central means by which foreign investment could be attracted and by which national competitiveness could be raised. Specifically, flexibilization would be achieved by layoffs, the hiring of substitute workers during strikes, the diversification of job categories, flexible wage systems, the strengthening of job placement efforts, and improvements in occupational training. Due to the very seriousness of the crisis, labour was strongly opposed to the key measures of redundancy layoffs and the hiring of substitute workers during labour disputes, which they argued would undermine labour’s mobilizational strength (Sun Hak Tae 2002:260–261). However, in deciding how to respond to these measures, the Korean labour movement was faced with the fundamental dilemma of whether neoliberal restructuring should be resisted through mass mobilization, as in the 1996/96 General Strike, or whether ‘national unity’ with government and business should be pursued to overcome the crisis. Whilst neither approach necessarily guaranteed a more favourable effect on the livelihood of Korean workers, in the course of events, the KCTU adopted the latter approach.

After a meeting with IMF director Michael Camdessuss, and after Kim Dae-Jung appeared to retreat on the immediate passing of the layoff bill, the leaders of the KCTU and the FKTU altered their initial stance of opposition to layoffs, and consequently agreed to enter into negotiations with government and business.6 The Tripartite Commission (Nosajông wuiwonhoe) was set up as a social pact making forum through which government, business and labour could jointly work out a restructuring programme. After three weeks of negotiations and a particularly protracted negotiation session on 6 February, government, business and labour apparently overcame their differences and reached the First Tripartite Accord. This Accord covered areas such as corporate restructuring, unemployment countermeasures, social security system, labour’s basic rights, and labour market flexibility (Sun Hak Tae 2002:260–261).

The Accord was presented by the government as a great success in terms of achieving the social consensus required to carry out the ‘necessary restructuring’. Although it had been widely thought that the reaching of an agreement between government, business and labour was impossible, it was argued that the social agreement was made possible due to the ‘the restored trust among the three parties, the willingness for fair burden-sharing and the cooperative spirit of overcoming the national crisis’ (KOILAF 1998). From labour’s point of view, however, the Accord represented labour’s agreement to what it had so virulently opposed in the 1996/97 strike, and more besides.

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